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This paper argues that the relational approach can be particularly effective for 
addressing head-on debates about the varieties of capitalism and the dynamics of 
institutional contexts. Using the case study of transnational law firms and data 
gathered through interviews with partners in London and New York the paper makes 
two arguments. First, it shows how relational approaches can help disaggregate 
existing descriptions of national institutional systems and reveal the importance of 
studying their constitutive practices. Understanding these micro-level variations, 
something missed by macro-level categories like Anglo-American, is shown to be 
essential to better understand if national business systems are or are not changing. 
Secondly, the paper suggests that the relational approach’s focus upon actor-
networks can be used to provide more insight into how the agency of managers and 
workers informs the management of institutional heterogeneity by TNCs. The 
peculiarities of professional service management and the influence of the home-
country are shown to determine the response of globalizing law firms when home- 
and host-country business practices diverge.   
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Managing the transnational law firm: professional systems, 
embedded actors and time-space sensitive governance 
 
1) Introduction 
Theoretical discussions of transnational corporations (TNCs) associated with 
both the relational turn (Bathelt and Glückler, 2005; Boggs and Rantisi, 2003) and the 
reinvigoration of the network concept (Amin and Thrift, 1992; Grabher, 2006; Dicken 
et al., 2001) in economic geography. The relational network-forms that underlie 
economic activities are not described as static architectures but as ongoing socio-
economic accomplishments constructed through the negotiation of, amongst other 
things, complex and dynamic institutional backdrops (Ettlinger, 2003; Murphy, 2003; 
Yeung, 2005). Consequently, as Dicken et al., (2001, 91) argue, “This relational 
methodology…does not automatically assume individuals, firms or nation states as 
‘black boxes’. Rather…to understand networks and their embedded relations 
requires us to probe into the socio-spatial constitution of these individuals, firms and 
institutions”.      
Perhaps one of the most insightful yet understudied case studies is the ever 
growing cohort of transnational law firms that now exist. As Beaverstock et al., (1999) 
note, these firms aim to provide services to TNC clients when cross-border business 
deals (e.g. mergers, financial restructurings) require globally aligned strategies that 
are also locally acceptable in each jurisdiction. This entails the development of local-
global capabilities with local embeddedness in national regulatory environments yet 
globally integrated service delivery. It is perhaps surprising, then, that beyond a few 
important initial forays into the industry (Beaverstock, 2004; Faulconbridge, 2007; 
Faulconbridge and Muzio, 2007; Jones, 2002, 2007; Warf, 2001) geographers have 
not studied the networks of these firms in more detail. . In particular, insights into the 
way globalizing professional service firms are embedded by time-space contingent, 
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national professional institutional systems can be gained from such studies. . In 
particular, insights into the way globalizing professional service firms are embedded 
by time-space contingent, national professional institutional systems can be gained 
from such studies. This is significant because recent years have seen a continuation 
of debates about the complexities of processes of change, convergence and 
persistence in national business systems as TNCs act as vectors of Anglo-American 
capitalist practices (Clark and Wόjcik, 2005). In the case of law firms there has been 
a debate about whether the ‘Americanization’ of legal practice can be expected as a 
result of the worldwide influence of transnational firms (Economist, 1996; Morgan, 
2006). Of course, as Gertler (2001; 2004) has so convincingly shown, the influence 
of these law firms is unlikely to be a linear process of worldwide convergence leading 
to all law firms replicating Anglo-American practices. Instead any change is likely to 
be partial, spatially variegated and influenced by a range of variables including the 
home-country of the firm and the agency of managers. For Morgan (2005, 3) better 
understanding is, therefore, needed of “how differently organized owners, managers, 
and employees construct and change different kinds of organizational capabilities 
and strategies in contrasting institutional environments”. 
Despite a few notable examples (e.g. Bathelt and Gertler, 2006; Yeung, 
2001), particularly in work on the globalization of retail TNCs (Coe and Sook-Lee, 
2006; Wrigley et al., 2005), the analytical tools of relational economic geography 
have not, however, been fully used to address in a head-on fashion these debates 
about the dynamics of the varieties of capitalism. I make two arguments in this 
regard. First, I highlight the ability of the relational approach to focus upon the micro-
scale subtleties of national institutional systems. This enables a more intricate, fine-
grained and insightful analysis of the way practice-level variations in institutional 
norms and behaviours constrain the activities of TNCs. This also allows us to capture 
forms of practice-level change that are driven by the activities of TNCs but are often 
missed in more abstract descriptions of national systems where coherent units (e.g. 
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Anglo-American; coordinated or liberal market) are the focus of analysis (Crouch, 
2005). Secondly, I show how using the tools of relational economic geography helps 
us understand the effects of the agency of workers and managers who plot in 
industry- and firm-specific ways to resist or promote the rollout or adaptation of 
home-country practices is a vital in order to explain change processes.  
The rest of the paper develops these arguments over four further sections. 
The next section locates these issues in the context of existing debates in economic 
geography and further highlights the strength of relational analyses for developing 
understanding of the way institutional heterogeneity is managed by TNCs. Sections 
three and four present empirical material that examines the way transnational law 
firms manage across heterogeneous contexts and the variations in approach that 
exist across space, time and between firms. Section five offers some conclusions.  
 
2) Embedded actor-networks  
   One of the tenets of the relational framework is an approach that identifies 
“actors in networks, their ongoing relations and the structural outcomes of these 
relations” (Dicken et al., 2001, 91). This provides detailed consideration of how 
“economic agents are situated in particular contexts of social relations and operate 
under specific institutional and cultural conditions” (Bathelt, 2006, 226). This 
inseparability of the economic and the socio-cultural has long been debated, often 
drawing on the concept of embeddedness (Granovetter, 1985; Peck, 2005; Polanyi, 
1944) as most recently demonstrated by Hess’ (2004) three-pronged analysis of the 
embeddedness of TNCs. At one level this means unpicking the national and 
international regulatory actors shaping the globalization strategies of firms (Hess and 
Coe, 2006; Liu and Dicken, 2006). At another level, the cultural and institutional 
embeddedness of the actors in TNCs themselves also influences this process. 
Murphy (2003), for example, provides an insightful and detailed study of the way 
credit, reputation and information spaces are used by workers in manufacturing 
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industries in Tanzania to facilitate their activities. These spaces can only be 
maintained when appropriate, culturally-informed behaviours are exhibited by 
workers familiar with local norms. Similar findings have been noted in relation to the 
way individuals negotiate spaces of learning and knowledge management in TNCs 
(Faulconbridge, 2006; Uzzi and Lancaster, 2003).  
The challenges of negotiating such spaces are, of course, all central to 
debates in the varieties of capitalism literatures (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Gertler, 
2004). As Wrigley et al., (2005) reveal using the case study of globalizing retailers, 
firms both rollout and adapt home-country practices overseas as a result of 
institutional heterogeneity and the associated variations in cultural norms. On 
occasions firms also engage in reverse-feedbacks where techniques learnt overseas 
are used in the home-country. Increasingly common are also attempts to change 
host-country national institutional contexts and business systems. Whilst there is little 
agreement about the extent and effectiveness of such change, these strategies are 
increasingly said to mean “national constellations should be thought of as 
continuously evolving manifestations of institutional conditions and economic 
structures that support and influence one another in a reflexive manner” (Bathelt and 
Gertler 2005, 2). This, and the influence of transnational governance institutions and 
neoliberal discourses are ultimately said to be leading to subtle forms of change over 
time in national systems (see Wόjcik, 2006; Clark and Wόjcik, 2005; Djelic and 
Sahlin-Andersson, 2006), not necessarily towards a form of convergence and 
homogeneity, but instead towards a state where there are converging divergences 
(Katz and Darbishire 2000).  
Two problems exist, however, in existing literatures that capture this 
phenomenon. First, they are unable to describe processes of change without 
returning to the problematic binary of persistence versus convergence. As both 
Becker (2007) and Crouch (2005) argue, this is because approaches, such as that of 
Hall and Soskice (2001), assume all parts of a national system are complementary 
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and must change in unison. In searching for such paradigm-like shifts more subtle 
forms of instability are missed.  Some manage to skirt around such issues in 
empirical research more effectively than others (e.g. Morgan, 2006) and I want to 
suggest here that the approach of relational economic geography might be useful for 
further resolving this problem, primarily because of its insistence of studying the finer 
details of place-specific institutional contexts. This provides the opportunity to unpack 
the multifaceted nature of institutional contexts and reveal the way that change can 
be partial and limited to certain elements of a system. Independent practice-level 
changes, something obscured by studying systems as closed units under the title of 
Anglo-American, Japanese, liberal-market or otherwise, are in need of further study. 
As Becker (2007) points out, the elements of a system that are most obviously 
functionally related to its core values might be less likely to change when put under 
pressure by TNCs or other transnational institutions. However, the antecedents of 
wider change might be evolution in other less central components, something missed 
in existing studies. I attempt to consider such issues here. A second problem with 
existing approaches, as Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson (2006) argue, is that studies 
often also fail to bring in the multitude of actors in TNCs involved in negotiating the 
management and evolution of national institutional contexts. As Crouch (2005) notes, 
firms need to be seen as institutional entrepreneurs and as active players in the 
development of institutional settings. Sensitivity to the ‘relational geometries’ that 
influence and are influenced by TNCs can help deal with this issue. For Yeung these 
geometries “are neither actors (e.g. individuals and firms) nor structures (e.g. class, 
patriarchy and the state), but configurations of relations between and among them” 
(Yeung, 2005, 38). Here I show how studying the way the agency of managers and 
workers in TNCs, alongside the state and other actors, determines the strategies and 
behaviours of TNCs when operating across diverse institutional contexts is a useful 
way to reveal the preconditions of change.  
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The rest of the paper, therefore, examines the way the governance practices 
used in transnational law firms are defined as a result of three overlapping 
influences. First, the unique national varieties of professional, institutional and 
cultural context that characterize the work practices of lawyers in each country. 
Second, a desire for the implementation of ‘global’ (usually home-country influenced) 
ideals throughout the firm. And third, sector-specific socially constructed 
management processes that determine the ways different actors in the firm exercise 
control.  
 
Globalization, institutional contexts and varieties of professional practice in 
transnational law firms 
The emergence of a cadre of transnational law firms (see table 1) is an 
ongoing process. The aim of these globalizing organizations, as one firm’s promotion 
material suggests, is “to collaborate across all our offices and practices to deliver our 
services to uniformly high standards, in a well rehearsed manner and for a 
competitive price” (http://www.allenovery.com [accessed 3/5/2006]). However, as 
Beaverstock et al., (1999) describe, it could be argued that beyond Baker and 
McKenzie few, if any of the other leading firms (table 1), are truly global1. Instead, the 
globalization strategy of these firms has involved seeking out important locations 
from where key corporate clients can be served. Hence the term transnational is 
often used when referring to these firms to indicate the partiality of globalization 
processes and the continued influence of place and states over activities. 
Nevertheless, as figure 1 shows, the number of strategically important locations that 
                                            
1 Beaverstock et al., (1999) identified Baker and McKenzie, Clifford Chance and Coudert Brothers as 
the only firms showing global tendencies – i.e. they had offices in all three major economic arenas 
(Europe, North American and South East Asia). Since this time Coudert Brothers have ceased 
operating.  
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leading firms operate in has grown in recent times (compare the locations to those 
highlighted by Beaverstock et al., 1999). As a result, the managerial challenges 
associated with creating local-global integration and embedded organizational 
network forms have become multifaceted. Indeed, as Flood (1995, 175) notes, “Law 
firms, as organisations, were originally built to function within particular societies with 
particular mores. Now they transplant themselves across borders where the same 
principles and mores do note necessarily obtain. Inevitably there are strains”.  
[Insert table 1 and figure 1 somewhere here] 
 
One of these strains, alongside the fact that law itself remains a nationally 
fragmented system, is the need for firms to hire lawyers trained and qualified to 
practice in each of the jurisdictions they operate in. Law, as a formal profession with 
defined regulatory authorities and closure regimes to restrict entry to those with 
suitable qualifications (see Abbott, 1984), has a powerful national institutional 
context. As Trubek et al., (1994, 411) suggest, each national jurisdiction exists as a 
‘legal field’. As they describe, “By ‘legal field’ we mean the ensemble of institutions 
and practices through which law is produced, interpreted, and incorporated into 
social decision-making”. One key contingency of each field is the peculiarities of the 
national cultures and work practices of lawyers, what Trubek et al., (1994, 415-416) 
describe as “The actual behaviours of lawyers and others within a dynamic set of 
relationships”. This has been described elsewhere as the ‘national system of the 
professions’ and the ‘varieties of professionalism’ (Dietrich and Robins, 1990; 
Faulconbridge and Muzio, 2007; Lane et al. 2002; Nelson and Trubek, 1992; 
Torstendahl and Burrage, 1990) in work which dovetails with that on the varieties of 
capitalism. This recognises the varying relationships that exist between a number of 
important actors to give each national ‘field’ its own unique identity and 
characteristics.  
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Table 2 details the actors and their relational influence on national 
professional fields. The outcomes in terms of the peculiarities of each national 
system have been widely documented (Trubek et al., 1994; Flood, 1995). These 
include, first, differences in the way legislation informs the structuring of transactions 
(interpretation in civil law versus scientific application in common law). Second, 
influence over whether large law firms capable of managing large corporate mergers 
and restructurings are permitted. This in part determines the ‘norms’ of the working 
conditions of lawyers – i.e. whether they are used to working in large firms with their 
related formalities (see Morgan and Quack, 2005). This links to the third effect noted 
and the focus of the paper, the way institutional systems create nationally specific 
work practices. This pertains to micro-scale factors such as how lawyers are 
managed, remunerated, treated at different stages of their career and, more broadly, 
how lawyers behave in their day-to-day work.  Consequently, as Smigel (1965, 266) 
notes, “the practicing organization (the large law firm) does not have to create its own 
rules to the extent that they are provided for by the outside agencies”.  
It is somewhat surprising, then, that the way transnational law firms deal with 
this spatially variegated legal practice and ‘culture’ has not been explored in detail. 
Not only does this offer insight into the way firms become embedded by the 
institutional contexts of the overseas locations they operate in but it also offers the 
opportunity to examine the affects of the strategies of firms on ongoing processes of 
change in institutional contexts and business systems. As The Economist (1996) 
noted, globalizing law firms have attempted to ‘wrap red tape around the world’ and 
construct a set of transnational norms for the delivery of corporate legal services. 
Again, more sensitive analyses (e.g. Morgan and Quack, 2005) have managed to 
describe the subtleties of this process so as to dispute the homogenising thesis. 
However, even here the finer-grained details of change and its trajectory are often 
missed. This is where the relational approach becomes useful. It draws our attention 
to changes at the practice-level and the role of managers and workers alongside the 
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other actors detailed in table 2 in determining the place-specific trajectories of this 
change. Here I focus upon two of the seven components Hall and Soskice (2001) 
suggest give a national system is characteristics -  employer-employee relations and 
training and education systems – and consider how law firms deal with international 
variations in norms.  
 [Insert table 2 somewhere here] 
 
3) Managing local-global integration in law firms      
 
Methodology 
The following analysis is based upon insights from two sets of data. The main 
themes of the analysis were explored and initial ideas developed through a series of 
29 interviews completed in 2003-2004. This was then supplemented with more 
focussed discussions with 25 partners working for transnational law firms in London 
and New York in 2005-2006. It is data gathered from this latter round of interviews 
that is presented below. These 25 interviews were with partners in 15 different firms. 
Individuals held positions in several practice groups and had a range of differing 
career experiences (table 3). Partners (and not more junior lawyers) were selected 
both because of their role in the negotiation and adaptation of firm practices and 
because of their positions, in theory at least, as autonomous co-owners of the firm 
(see below). All interviewees were quizzed about their approach to four main aspects 
of legal work (conflict of interest management; remuneration practice; practice group 
divisional strategies; and training practice) as well as the importance and role of 
autonomy in their work, the type of managerial structures in place in the firm and the 
strategies used for creating local-global integration. Interviews lasted between 35 and 
95 minutes and, with the exception of two, were recorded and fully transcribed. 
Analysis was completed by coding the interview transcripts and identifying the key 
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themes to emerge from discussions (table 4). All quotations used in the paper have 
been made anonymous to protect the identity of interviewees. 
While it would have been preferable to complete a more extensive set of 
focussed interviews, this proved impossible2. Two limitations of the data should, then, 
be noted. Interviews were only conducted in two cities, London and New York. Most 
interviewees were, therefore, only able provide insights into on goings within offices 
located in those cities. The exception here was four interviewees who had worked in 
several offices of the firm. Consequently, away from the four firms in which interviews 
were completed in both London and New York and in which partners with overseas 
experience were interviewed it is more difficult to examine some of the subtle of 
variations in practices between offices. Consequently discussions with lawyers 
without experience outside of the city they were interviewed in are only used to 
provide insights into the norms of legal practice in their country of work.   
 
[Insert tables 3 & 4 about here] 
 
Defining characteristics  
As noted, one of the strengths of relational analyses is their focus upon the 
multiply embedded actors influencing the activities of TNCs. This allows us to not 
only get to grips with the way institutional contexts emerge but also how the 
differential agency of actors in TNCs determines the way firms manage across 
heterogeneous contexts. This means it is important to understand how the social 
                                            
2 These interviews were completed during a period of high demand for legal services and, many during, 
as one interviewee put it, the busiest summer on memory. Consequently it was not possible to secure 
interviews with all of the original research design. Such difficulties in securing the access needed to 
develop extensive interview datasets with ‘elite’ actors in corporations has been well documented 
(Geoforum, 1999). As a result it is always necessary to approach such research pragmatically and to 
recognise the limitations imposed by access restrictions on the collection of ideal datasets. 
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systems of management in TNCs enhance or inhibit the influence of different parties 
and the way this influences the management of institutional heterogeneity. As both 
Ferner et al., (2006) and Løwendahl (2000) argue, the chosen management strategy 
of a firm determines the extent to which actors in subsidiaries can negotiate with 
headquarters about the implementation of (home-country influenced) governance 
practices. This is especially significant in the case of law firms. 
A core feature of a professional occupation such as law is the need for skill, 
knowledge and judgement to deal with undefined problems in everyday work 
(Dietrich and Roberts, 1997; Freidson, 2001; Raelin, 1991). Because of this, 
professionals normally resist being directly supervised or managed and place value 
on having the freedom to organize and execute their work as they see fit. This facet 
of the management of PSFs has long been recognized, the result being, according to 
Mintzberg (1979) and more recently Alvesson (2002), an ‘adhocracy’ – a style of 
organization that prioritizes the discretion of individual professionals rather than 
control by management. This contrasts with the accepted norm in most 
manufacturing firms where direct managerial control and hierarchies – what 
Mintzberg (1979) calls bureaucracy – are used to coordinate and supervise activities. 
Further distinguishing the behaviour of key actors in a unique stratum of PSFs is the 
use of the partnership model of governance (Empson and Chapman, 2006). In this 
system those granted partnership become the co-owners and, therefore, joint 
managers of the firm. All law firms, as with accountants, operate as partnerships 
because of regulation preventing the commercial structuring and public ownership of 
such practices3. This is said to, first, remove commercial pressures from the delivery 
of such ‘public safeguard’ services. Partnerships are not responsible to shareholders 
                                            
3 This has begun to change in some countries with the Clementi reforms in the UK making it possible 
for the first time for law firms to be structured as commercial organizations with shareholders. 
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and do not have to provide ‘shareholder value’ or ‘returns on investment’. Second, 
partnership creates ‘reputation’ advantages for firms. Because of the intangible 
nature of professional services and the inability of the client to judge its quality, being 
governed by partnership and having co-owners as service deliverers is seen as a 
way of indicating the commitment of all providing the service to high levels of quality 
(Empson and Chapman, 2006)4.   
Combined the values of professionalism and the partnership logic mean senior 
partners or those given the title ‘managing partner’ are not managers as exist in 
hierarchically structured manufacturing or non-professional serve firms. Lazega 
(2001) describes how partnerships are, nonetheless, more efficient than they might 
first appear because of their relational nature. Individuals can only succeed if they 
strategically negotiate the support of their peers both with work but also in exercising 
influence over decision-making. The most influential partners are those who have 
cultivated such relational assets over time and, in particular, those partners who can 
provide work for others and thus command their respect (see also Lazega and 
Krackhardt, 2000). Consequently it is often the way these influential partners, who 
are often given the title of ‘managing’ or ‘senior’ partner’, deal with the resistance 
from other lawyers to ‘management decisions’ that is key to the successful 
coordination of firms. 
These peculiarities of law firm management affect the way key actors in law 
firms manage the spatially contingent institutional conditions of professional practice. 
                                            
4 The commitment to quality is thought to be secured in two ways. First, partners have to provide 
capital from their own salaries to support the firm. This capital is used to fund the opening of new 
offices and other strategic ventures. If the firm fails, due to poor client relations or otherwise, the 
partners lose their capital, as happened to partners at Coudert Brothers when the firm was wound up in 
2005. Second, partners are liable to varying degrees if the firm is sued for negligence. The limited 
liability model of partnership has slightly changed this, limited the amount that partners are liable for 
and using insurance to cover anything in excess of set limits.   
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As Jones (2002) has previously argued, a high degree of consultation is needed in 
the decision making and ‘management’ process in PSFs. This was reflected in 
interviews when, again and again, lawyers (particularly those working for English 
firms) commented upon the fact that rarely was a decision made or ‘strategy’ 
implemented without consultation with all the partners. It was recognized that 
anything more than a very small group of unhappy individuals could lead to disaster. 
Individuals might refuse to implement the decisions made or, alternatively, leave the 
firm, taking their intellectual capital with them. As one lawyer summarized the 
situation:  
“One of the reasons professionals, and particularly lawyers, become professionals is 
they are quite defensive and proud of the fact that they have a considerable amount 
of autonomy. And one of the issues that any management in a law firm has to deal 
with is the trade of between maintaining lawyers autonomy and…developing a 
[global] strategy that lawyers can buy into” (2).  
 
As the quotation suggests, lawyers were nonetheless aware of the need for some 
degree of coordination in large-scale transnational firms. However, even within firms 
there was disagreement about the extent to which autonomy should be constrained 
by this. While the English lawyer quoted above described the importance of 
recognising lawyers’ desire for autonomy, an American colleague in the same firm 
suggested an alternative strategy. As he put it, “I don’t think there’s anywhere near 
enough management…the approach we take [respecting partners’ autonomy] makes 
management clunky and less efficient than it should be (22). Nevertheless, in all of 
the firms studied the partnership governance mechanism continues to require major 
management decisions to be authenticated through an all-partner vote. This 
inevitably requires consultation and consensus building and as the American lawyer 
quoted above noted:   
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“if you picked up a management textbook you would read that the critical tools of 
management include the ability to hire and fire and set the compensation. The tools 
available to the [firm x] management do not include the ‘hire and fire’ and setting 
compensation” (22). 
 
At the same time ‘managers’ within law firms will still exercise forms of agency 
designed to drive-through change and alter the perspectives of workers in overseas 
offices so as to allow for more integrated forms of operation. These tactics seem 
likely to be intimately linked to the gradual and incremental changes in national 
institutional systems described by others (Bathelt and Gertler, 2005; Djelic and 
Sahlin-Andersson, 2006; Yeung, 2001) and, when successful, allow firms to 
constantly reassess the degree of geographical contingency needed in the 
management of each office. This is, however, always going to be tainted in law firms 
by the professional systems discussed above, something that highlights why an 
actor-centred analysis of the effects of TNCs on institutional practices is so valuable. 
In non-professional services such as retail or manufacturing responses are likely to 
be influenced by different types of relationship between managers and workers 
leading to the implementation or adaptation of home-country practices in alternative 
ways. Below I consider how the peculiarities of professional values might influence 
the strategies of law firms and the way firms deal with variations in four work-
practices. I do this whilst promoting a practice-level analysis of institutional 
conditions. 
 
4) Structuring transnationally and locally embedded practice 
Table 5 provides analysis of the way institutional agents and legacies affect 
the work culture of lawyers in relation to conflict of interest management, 
remuneration practice, divisional strategies and training practice. Because of the 
distinctive nature of approaches in each jurisdiction that are determined by various 
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influential actors (table 2), and the autonomous preferences of lawyers that require 
‘management’ techniques sensitive to their expectations and values, law firms are 
forced to find governance strategies that are flexible enough to enable a compromise 
to be reached between the need for global alignment and local embeddedness. The 
rest of section, therefore, draws on the typology of Bartlett and Ghoshal (1998) as a 
heuristic for identifying the four ‘ideal-type’ approaches available to transnational law 
firms for overcoming these challenges. In this typology four approaches are 
described: 
• Global – where headquarters (HQs) create strategies and ‘best practice’ all 
subsidiaries implement;  
• International – where HQs defines strategy that each subsidiary implements 
using their own forms of practice;  
• Multinational – where each subsidiary defines its own strategies and practice; 
• Transnational – where vertical (between HQs and subsidiaries) and 
horizontally (subsidiary-subsidiary) consultation leads to firm-wide negotiated 
and agreed strategies and ‘best practice’.   
 
[Insert table 5 about here]   
The empirical material revealed that, firms do not use one of these ‘ideal type’ 
models to globalize. Instead complex relational geometries produce inconsistent 
responses to the roll out of home-country systems, both between countries but also 
within different elements of one national system. This means combinations of the four 
models are adopted differently in each country so as to respond to degrees of 
distinctiveness that exist at the level of individual practices. Examples of how 
English-originating transnational law firms, in which multiple interviews were 
completed, have experienced this challenge are examined below whilst table 6 
provides examples of the way US-originating firms use the different approaches. This 
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is significant because, as I show in the next section, the way firms use such 
approaches varies depending on home-country influences as well as the context of 
the host-country, something complicated by the fact that the influence of the latter 
also changes over time.  
 
Global coordination 
When used, globally uniform policies are accepted by lawyers primarily 
because professional logics in relation to the issues being managed are influenced in 
a limited way by forms of ‘local’ or ‘societal’ embeddedness (Hess, 2004). This is the 
case when lawyers have a number of shared approaches and values and, therefore, 
the adaptation of home-country strategies is unnecessary. An important example of 
this is the worldwide control by management committees of conflict of interest 
standards. This existed in all of the firms studied in because of the forms of 
transnational best practice described in table 5. Despite variations in the 
technicalities of a conflict, corporate lawyers worldwide tend to accept and use US or 
UK standards. As one lawyer argued: 
“we have structures to avoid conflicts …We’re a transaction driven firm and you don’t 
want a situation where you could have had a primary role on a deal but because 
someone had done something small in the past you’re going to get dinged.” (9). 
 
Table 6 provides examples of when global coordination is used by US firms as well 
as examples of their use of the international and multinational approaches discussed 
below.  
[Insert table 6 here]   
 
International coordination 
When there are cultural, institutional legacies influencing the practices of 
lawyers the global approach is inappropriate. ‘International’ coordination is, therefore, 
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used in transnational law firms when degrees of firm-wide coherence are needed but 
when global approaches threaten to excessively impede the autonomy of individuals 
or create ‘culture’ clashes due to moderate degrees of variation in the approaches to 
and ‘norms’ of legal practice. Such ‘moderate’ degrees of variation usually exist when 
the basic principles and values of the profession have always been or have become 
similar in two countries. Outside of a professional setting the implementation of global 
standards might be expected.  
One example of this is the way several English firms manage the structuring 
of practice groups in the USA (New York specifically). Transnational firms ideally 
need the same types of legal practice to be developed in every office so global 
projects can be managed through cross-border teams. For example, if a TNC is 
merging with a rival and anti-trust advice is needed relating to multiple jurisdictions it 
is essential that lawyers with expertise in this issue exist in each office. However, one 
interviewee that had experience of working in multiple offices of an English firm 
described the ‘international’ approach used to deal with differences in the norms of 
practice group use and structuring in the USA as follows: 
“It’s a bit like Vogue magazine. The magazine is published in 31 countries and each 
one has some common elements but at the same time all the countries are able to 
develop their own unique features to reflect local markets and expectations…A good 
example is how the M&A, finance and securities practices are organized in the firm. 
In the UK, each one is very separate, despite often working together. So there are 
clear teams for each. Here in the US they are much more blended together, so we’ve 
kind of merged the three and even located them together in the office” (16).    
   
In this scenario the New York office, and individuals within it, had the freedom to 
develop practice groups as they see fit as long as the core group of services are 
provided. An international approach is suitable because of the degrees of 
convergence that exist (practice groups are common in both jurisdictions and 
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expected by lawyers) yet the local institutional nuances at the fringes (see table 5 for 
discussion of the processes creating such a situation). Failing to recognise such 
‘cultural’ subtleties can be detrimental to the success of an overseas office. As one 
interviewee in New York working for a different English law firm that hadn’t 
recognised the important variations in practice group composition commented in 
relation to the recent decision of managing partners to disband in New York the 
group that [description role], “The decision was made not to have a trust and estates 
practice even though it’s normal and unfortunately that can help in my work in New 
York. And that’s one of those things where economically it was a wise decision not to 
have it, but certainly it would be preferential for me and it’s made me uncomfortable 
with things” (19). In a context where professional values are less influential more 
global structures might be expected. However, because of the need to avoid the type 
of upset caused by such actions and the negative effects on the performance of the 
firm when lawyers react against decisions they find uncomfortable through either exit 
(leaving the firm) or voice (openly challenge management decisions) this is not the 
case in law firms.   
 
Multinational coordination 
When the institutional legacies affecting professional values create 
fundamental spatial variations in practice with little cross-jurisdiction commonality, 
and when these values have strong and powerful legacies that continue to influence 
lawyers, protracted transnational negotiations serve little purpose and each office is 
left to define and implement its own ‘national’ organizational strategies. At one level 
this is necessary because of the nationally-specific nature of law. This is the 
regulatory embeddedness many firms experience. In addition, variations in the 
cultural norms of workers are also significant. For example, differing national cultures 
influencing the way newly recruited lawyers are treated and trained also require the 
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use of multinational strategies. Differences between the practices used in England, 
the USA (New York) and Germany help explain the reasons for such variations.  
In England it is widely accepted that having a dedicated cadre of ‘professional 
support lawyers’ is essential. These are not paralegals as in the US sense and do not 
engage in any fee-earning work. Rather, this is a group of support staff that, amongst 
other things, provide training for interns5. Trainees in England also usually sit in the 
same office as a partner. This facilitates regular mentoring as trainees work 
alongside and observe partners. These norms are a result of the way lawyers’ 
training is regulated in England. Here law graduates must complete a two year 
training contract whilst working as an ‘intern’ at a law firm. This programme is 
scrutinized by The Law Society and requires partners to mentor trainees and write 
reports on their performance. Only on successful completion of this programme do 
individuals become fully licensed lawyers. English firms tried and would still like to 
implement the professional support lawyer and office sharing systems in all of their 
branches. However, there is no regulatory requirement elsewhere for such 
arrangements and consequently training norms are very different. In New York 
partners feel that it is inappropriate to share office space with their subordinates. As 
one New York-based lawyer familiar with the English approach because of the time 
he had spent in London commented, “If I got a partner here and told him to share an 
office with a first year associate he’d be out the door – so we don’t – partners get the 
big offices to themselves” (24). In the USA graduates from law school must pass the 
State BAR exam in order to become a registered lawyer and partners and associates 
tend to live very different lives and only interact as and when work requires. One US 
                                            
5 Other duties of professional support lawyers include the maintenance of knowledge 
management systems, the provision of legislative updates to all lawyers through newsletters 
and briefing sessions, and the development of electronic resources such as online precedent 
databases. 
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lawyer commented upon the fact that “they [partners] just expect people by osmosis 
to figure it out.  And that’s how I learned, I taught myself.  And it’s very hard and a lot 
of people fall through the cracks, but that’s just how it is” (25).  
The German offices of English firms operate with different dynamics again. 
The need for trainees to complete a range of formal exams suggests greater 
emphasis on formal learning and ‘legal scholarship’ than exists in the USA or 
England. To become a qualified lawyer in Germany individuals must first complete a 
four to five year degree programme and pass their first state examination (the erstes 
Staatsexamen). They then have to fulfil a two year training contract (the 
Referendariat) and finally sit a second state exam (the zweites Staatsexamen) (see 
Lane et al., 2002). The German offices of transnational law firms usually take 
graduates after completing the erstes Staatsexamen and then provide the necessary 
training to complete the following stages. Training in Germany is, then, designed 
using the German ‘technik’ logic that emphasizes quality through the creation of 
expertise in employees (see Gertler [2004] for discussion of a similar process in 
manufacturing). Trainees and also partners consequently spend a large amount of 
time studying ‘the law, something which is required in many civil law jurisdictions but 
considered unusual in the common law jurisdictions that transnational firms emerge 
from. As a lawyer who had worked in Germany for a number of years commented 
about his German colleague’s behaviour: 
“And there’s the German lawyer who does the excellent research pieces and a 
contributing editor to 300 books and teaches at a university, all of which is good, but 
how are we going to pay for this?…So it’s the same basic structure but the German 
partner says I’ve this huge profile because I’m a leading author” (21)  
 
Transnational law firms thus do not always aim to create aligned global working 
practices and organizational firms. Proven human resource best practices such as 
the office sharing used by English law firms in London are not implemented 
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universally as a result, something that in a non-professional context would be 
avoided through the use of international strategies that respect regulatory variations 
but override cultural norms.  
 
Transnational negotiation  
As both Gertler (2001) and Whitley (2001) suggest, there are few examples of 
what might be termed ‘strong convergence’, where the home-country systems of a 
firm are influenced by overseas experience and subsequently reconfigured. More 
common is transnational negotiation that leads to home-country norms being applied 
overseas but in a mutated form. Such negotiation is used by transnational law firms 
when a globally coordinated approach is considered important for the successful 
functioning of the firm but where there are significant variations in culture and norms 
between jurisdictions. For example, remuneration models are a constant source of 
tension in transnational law firms. This has been noted most extensively in relation to 
the differences between remuneration logics where the prevalence of ‘eat what you 
kill’ in the USA is matched by the prevalence of the ‘lockstep’ system in England (see 
table 5). Firm x, a major English firm in table 1, faced just such a challenge when 
opening an office in New York and as one of the London-based managing partners 
commented: 
“the dominant culture of our firm is very much a consensus driven, collegiate, 
lockstep driven institutional business. And that, to some lawyers in the States, is 
deeply unattractive…That means we’re not going to grow as fast as we would 
like…But our conclusion has been that its better to have a business in the US that’s 
aligned to our overall culture than to allow it to develop as a separate sub-culture” (2). 
 
A lawyer in the New York office of the same firm also recognised this challenge. As 
he put it, “I think there are very very significant cultural benefits that come from a 
shared lockstep system…[but] you know, that’s [also] caused a migration of talent 
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away from the firm, it has diminished profitability…It is not a system that has its first 
goal profit maximisation and if that’s your first goal you’re repelled by it” (22). 
Spatially variable remuneration models that would cater for such differences are 
considered unsuitable in the global professional partnerships used in law firms. 
Lawyers expect their peers to be paid using the same formula worldwide. As the 
previous quotation suggests, this can create tensions. Consequently, negotiations 
between partners, driven by the senior partner and those with power and influence, 
have been necessary to find a compromise and way forward that all partners 
throughout the world feel comfortable with. This involves the canvassing of opinion 
from partners in all offices, the development of proposals that allow the adaptation of 
home-country models, and the championing of these proposals by managing 
partners, senior partners and others with influence so that when the all-partner vote 
is implemented the vast majority have been convinced of the new model’s legitimacy.  
Ultimately the partnership in firm x agreed to a modified lockstep model that resulted 
in the adaptation of home-country norms to allow ‘super points’ to be awarded in 
recognition of the predominance of ‘eat what you kill values’ in some jurisdictions. A 
quicker and simpler to implement global approach may well seem logical in other 
contexts where professional values do not influence the management of the firm.   
 
 
5) Spatial, temporal and home-country complications in the management of 
institutional difference 
The discussion above highlights how the need to ‘negotiate’ with partners and 
appease their autonomous tendencies, alongside the influence of the state, 
professional bodies and educational institutions, leads to professional service firms 
being particularly sensitive to institutional difference and managing in what could be 
described as inefficient and irrational manners. The multinational management 
practices described are indicative of this with cultural alignment to local professional 
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norms being given higher priority than the rollout of home-country strategies. 
Nevertheless, as the example of transnational negotiation suggests, this does not 
mean ‘managers’ in firms abandon all hope of rolling out home-country practices 
overseas. Consequently firms use a combination of the four approaches outlined 
above depending on degrees of difference between home- and host-country systems 
at the practice-level and the success of attempts to change norms. For example, the 
‘international’ approach used by a US firm in Germany for promotion to partnership 
(table 6) is not used in London. Instead, ‘global’ coordination used with standard US 
procedures in place because of the smaller degrees of variation and forms of 
convergence in norms that exist. Similarly the South East Asian offices of English 
transnational law firms are more often managed using multinational coordination than 
other offices. Regulatory restrictions prevent foreign law firms entering the market in 
many countries unless they form an alliance with indigenous firms where over fifty 
percent of ownership is local. Consequently, multinational coordination is the only 
way to accommodate the practices of lawyers that are first and foremost determined 
by the local cultures of the partner firm. This reflects the unique nature of ‘Asian 
business systems’. As Yeung (2001) describes, although these have evolved in 
recent times as a result of various forms of global influence (including overseas 
trained managers and graduates) the systems continue to retain many of their 
distinctive characteristics and diverge from Anglo-American practices in many ways. 
The same is true for the legal field (The Lawyer, 2006). As one managing partner in a 
UK firm described: 
“our Asia offices…have a higher degree of autonomy.  Not withstanding the 
developments in information technology and communications, they are a long way 
away and have different approaches. So the influence is diluted…they’re actually left 
to get on with it, so they have a higher degree of autonomy is all respects (2).         
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Such static descriptions of management strategies do not fully reveal, however, the 
complexity the changes that occur over time as a result of the agency of managers in 
transnational law firms. Comments made by those with direct experience of working 
in multiple European jurisdictions, particularly France and Germany, highlighted how 
the challenges of institutional can be overcome using tactics designed to change the 
behaviours of lawyers (see Clark and Wόjcik, 2005; Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson, 
2006; Faulconbridge, 2007; Morgan and Quack 2005 for examples of similar 
processes). This has made it possible for more and more international and global 
strategies to be implemented (figure 2). One lawyer provided the following example 
of the affect of this on his firm’s French operations: 
“They [the French] never liked the name and approach of [English firm x] as they’ve 
seen it as an Anglo Saxon…That’s changed now and [firm x] has now become a 
dominant name in the French marketplace.  And it’s partly to do with what I call the 
Europeanization or the Anglo-Saxon-ization of Europe” (2). 
 
[Insert figure 2 somewhere here] 
This raises questions about the strategies used by firms to drive such change and 
also the wider impacts on host-country systems. Significantly the extent to which 
such change occurs is geographically variable (see also Gertler, 2001; 2004; Wόjcik, 
2006). Transnational law firms has primarily been on the practice and organization of 
law firms in major world cities (Beaverstock et al., 1999) and not ‘second order’ cities 
(e.g. Birmingham in England) where offices often do not exist. Consequently, as one 
interviewee noted:  
“Germany...They’ve got a lot of financial institutions there so they’ve had to adapt and 
Frankfurt firms are now very good competitors for London whereas the rest [other 
firms in Germany] are still catching up” (1). 
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Moreover, change only occurs in relation to some and not all practices, as the 
continued use of multinational coordination of training reveals It should not, then, be 
assumed that type of change described in figure 2 is leading to ‘strong convergence’ 
(Gertler, 2001). Nevertheless, further future investigation of the mechanisms and 
impacts of such change would seem warranted.  
    
6) Conclusions 
The work of Whitley (2001) suggests that the strategies and spatial variability 
described above should be expected because of how the degree of difference 
between home and host country systems determines the extent to which practices 
can be transferred smoothly. However, the findings presented here highlight two 
important issues missed in existing analyses.  First, and developing the argument of 
Crouch (2005), the analysis in this paper highlights the need to focus upon the 
intricacies of systems that are often presented as coherent units such as Anglo-
American or liberal market economies. As the data presented reveals, the responses 
of firms to institutional heterogeneity is conditioned by differences at the level of the 
practices that make up national systems (e.g. remuneration and associate training). 
The use in any one country of both global (convergence driving) and multinational 
(persistence promoting) strategies provides evidence of this. The relational economic 
geography approach helps reveal the way this practice-level variation and 
management effects transnational law firms because of its insistence on .  
Secondly, the paper reveals how the challenge of managing institutional 
heterogeneity is exaggerated in law firms by the principles of professional autonomy 
and partnership, the values of which underlie management systems. At the simplest 
level this highlights the importance of recognising sectoral differences in the ways 
TNCs manage across institutional heterogeneity. Studies of these issues in the 
context of manufacturing (e.g. Gertler, 2004) have outweighed studies of services 
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until recently when, for example, retail has acted as empirical lens for analysis (Coe 
and Lee-Sook; Wrigley et al., 2005). Consequently there has been an 
underestimation of the importance of studying the differences between industries and 
of how the social systems of management and the resultant variations in the agency 
of workers and managers affect the way firms rollout or adapt home-country 
practices. The relational approach and its fine-grained, textured analysis of the 
socially constructed geometries influencing firms and change in institutional systems 
would seem an ideal of way of approaching this challenge. Indeed, the agency 
described above acts at the level of practices rather than on systems as coherent 
units. The result is a process of change that may be partial in any one country as the 
less persistent values are altered first leaving other core and persistent features in 
tact, at least initially. This can be seen in the way firms evolve their approaches to 
management and go from using multinational to international approaches over time 
for certain practices but not others.     
Together these two insights into the strength of the relational approach for 
analysing the way TNCs negotiate and influence national institutional systems opens 
up a number of avenues for future research. In particular further examining the ways 
TNCs negotiate diverse business contexts through management strategies with a 
practice-level epistemology is likely to allow economic geographers to move beyond 
the polarised and simplified debates about persistence versus convergence that have 
plagued many literatures (Lane, 2003). As the analysis presented here suggests, the 
effects of TNCs actions sometimes, but not always, results in change, but change 
that is unlikely to lead to aligned worldwide systems (convergence). At the same time 
though systems are equally unlikely to remain completely untouched by the 
influences of globalization (persistence). Instead what might be termed converging 
divergences seem most likely (Katz and Darbishire, 2000), where some practices 
change but others do not. To further develop this idea though we still need to know 
more though about the tactics used to drive change and the way they facilitate 
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evolutions in both the perspectives of workers but also, where relevant, regulators 
and other institutional agents. This requires detailed empirical studies of the actions 
of influential managers in TNCs, the reactions of workers to strategies designed to 
drive change and the wider effects on indigenous firms of the introduction of foreign 
practices. Addressing in a head-on fashion such questions might prevent debates 
about the varieties of capitalism and change being another ‘missed boat’ for 
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Baker & McKenzie USA 1246 409 33 2,992 70 
Allen & Overy England 1239 409 33 2,263 25 
Latham & Watkins USA 1224 551 45 1,502 22 
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Lovells England 681 195 29 1,163 26 
Dechert USA 448 190 42 678 18 
 
Table 1. Key data on leading global law firms. 
Source: The Lawyer (2005) and fieldwork. 
*: figures based on the combined values for the firms DLA and Piper Rudnick who have 
now merged. 









Influence on national professional systems 
 
 
The state and/or regulators 
 
Either the state, or where the legal 
profession is granted autonomy from the 
state the appointed professional body (e.g. 
The Law Society in England and Wales), 
has significant influence over professional 






To be qualified to practice in a jurisdiction 
requires completion of a formal 
qualification controlled and administered by 
a nationally approved law school. As part 
of this training a socialization process 
occurs that helps mould lawyers in terms of 
their behaviour and practice in the 





Their demands condition the behaviour of 
lawyers. Historically clients only expected 
legal service that reflected the national 
systems they were use to (Hanlon, 1999). 
Increasingly show more demanding clients 
and, in particular, clients with overseas 
experience of legal services bring with 
them different expectations about the way 
legal services are delivered that challenge 
national norms (Morgan and Quack, 2005).  
 
 
Table 2. The main actors in the national system of the legal profession. 



















Partner, US firm 
 
2 London Male Managing Partner, London office English firm 
 
3 London Male Partner, US firm 
 
4 London Male Partner, US firm 
 
5 London Male Partner, US firm 
 
6 London Male Partner and Co-head of finance practice group, US firm 
 
7 London Male Partner, US firm 
 
8 London Male Partner and Co-head of practice group, US firm 
 
9 London Male Partner and Head of practice group, US firm 
 
10 London Male Partner and Head of practice group, US firm 
 
11 London Male Partner, US firm 
 
12 London Male Partner, US firm 
 
13 London Male Partner, Head of practice group, US firm 
 
14 London Male Partner, US firm 
 
15 London Male Partner, US firm 
 
16 New York Male Partner, English firm 
 








Partner, Co-head of practice group, US firm  
 
19 New York Male Partner, English firm 
 
20 New York Male Partner, Co-head of practice group, English firm 
 
21 New York Male Managing partner New York Office, English firm 
 
22 New York Male Partner, English firm 
 
23 New York Female Partner, English law firm 
 
24 New York Male Partner, English law firm 
 
25 New York Female Partner, US law firm 
 
 











Main issues raised 
 








 The continued 
distinctiveness of 
lawyers throughout 
the world (see 
discussion in table 5 for 
further details) 
 
 The convergence of lawyers practices in the 
main financial and business centres of the 
world:  
Several lawyers suggested that over the past ten 
years lawyers in London, New York, Frankfurt, 














 The need to have 
some global norms 
but also sensitivity to 
‘local’ cultural 
peculiarities; 
 The inability to ‘tie the 
network together’ as 
tightly as might like 
 
 The need to recognise that the bigger the firm 
the less it can adapt to local peculiarities: 
 
Two lawyers believed developing more global best 
practices that all offices implement is important 
 
One firm had ‘global’ procedures that had to be 
followed when working for one the firm’s TNC 
clients 
 
The need to give 
each office and 






 Global committees 
needed that have 
members from each 
office or at least each 
region who can raise 
concerns with plans; 
 Practice group heads 
and managing 
partners in each 
office to voice the 
opinion of their 
constituents about 
governance practices 




 The need for ‘partners with power’ (usually in the 
home country) who can force partners in other 
offices to follow firm-wide practices: 
 
In a number of US firms especially there existed 
an elite strata of partners who, because of their 
fee-earning ability (the finders) could force through 
changes elsewhere, even when created negative 
effects on overseas offices 
 
Table 4. The three substantive themes and sub-themes that emerged from the coding of 







































State – The US and UK 
approach to creating a 
legal profession and the 
principles associated with 
it has often been 
mimicked in other 
countries because of the 
early emergence of an 
independent legal 
profession in these 
countries. 
 
Clients and transnational 
law firms – UK/US 
standard now forms a 
global norm all lawyers 
adhere to. Failure to do 
so prevents lawyers 
working for transnational 
clients and is thus 
emerging as a 
transnational forms of 
governance (see Morgan 







The ‘eat what 














Law schools – the ethos 
of legal work instilled in 
trainees varies between 
countries. This 
determines whether 
success is defined 
competitively or as a 
result of teamwork and 
long-term commitment to 
the firm   
 
Eat what you kill is common in 
US corporate law firms. US law 
schools instil competition into 
trainees. All exams and then the 
cohort of graduates are ranked 
by year group. Individuals are 
socialized into the spirit of 
individualism reflecting Cravath’s 
principles; the idea of a 
‘tournament of lawyers’ where 
everyone competes for success 
and promotion continues 
(Galanter and Palay, 1981). More 
widely this also reflects the 
neoliberal, competitiveness 
discourse that first emerged in 
the USA and underlay economic 
policy.  
Lockstep is more common in, 
amongst others, English, and 
Australian firms (see Hanlon 
(1999) for history of this model). 
The lockstep ideal is reflected in 
law schools that do not rank 
exams or graduates (see 
Burrows and Black [1998] on the 
use of the lockstep model in 
 40 
Australia). This has begun to 
change in more recent times, 
especially as neoliberal 
discourses have become 














The state and 
professional associations 
– variations in regulation 
mean large law firms with 
divisional structures are 
relatively new or even 
banned in some 
jurisdictions. This 
influences whether 
lawyers are accustomed 
to acting as a generalist 
or a specialist in one 
element of law in a 
specialist practice group 
within a large firm.    
 
Clients – expectations in 
terms of whether lawyers 
are specialists in one field 
or generalist able to 
advice on all aspects of a 
transaction varies. 
Increasingly large 
corporations (and US/UK 
originating ones 
especially) insist that 
firms they employ provide 
such services 
 
Large firms existed throughout 
the twentieth century in the USA 
due to an absence of restrictions 
on firm size. Divisional structures 
quickly became common as the 
Cravath model was copied. In 
England the ban on firms with 
over 25 partners was only lifted in 
1967. Consequently, until the late 
1980’s few large firms existed.  
Divisional structures have 
become more common recently 
but are less institutionalised. As 
Morgan and Quack (2005) tell us, 
in Germany a very different 
situation exists. Corporate law 
firms didn’t develop until the very 
final part of the twentieth century. 
Large firms have only emerged 
since 1989 when re-regulation 
made firms employing more than 
10 lawyers feasible. 
Consequently many lawyers are 
still grappling with the idea of no-
longer being a generalist in a 
small firm. A similar revolution is 
just beginning in many countries 
























The state and 
professional associations 
– these determine 
whether formal training 
guidelines exist for newly 
qualified associates. This 
can influence whether 
partners are compelled to 
oversee the development 
of associates and the 




See section on multinational 
coordination in main body of text 
 




















define levels of 
service and 




standard letters provide best way to minimize 
claims of negligence and the tried, tested and 
internally scrutinized procedure mean they are 
accepted by lawyers as best practice. 
  
 
“Chicago was the first office in the network and it has a feel of 
headquarters because that’s where all our IT is based, and its where all 
our business development reports into…So it has a practical and 
administrative feel…our engagements letters for example are 
standardized and decided upon by people there and we can’t deviate 
from that because it defines what we do very tightly” (1). 
International Promotion to 
partnership 
The ‘up or out’ system where individuals either 
progress to become a partner or leave has to be 
punctuated with mid-points in some jurisdictions to 
reflect the local culture of having managing 
associates or junior partners. These individuals 
are not part of the global partnership and do not 
share profits, but can still hold the title of partner 
and have national level privileges associated with 
this. 
“One of the things that crops up is that in certain European jurisdictions, 
in particular Germany, there’s been a tradition of becoming partners 
relatively young in life. And that isn’t the way the big US or English firms 
operate. And there it has been necessary to look at the local situation 
and come up with something that addresses the local requirement but 
doesn’t undermine the way we do things in London or New York. So you 
might get ‘national partners’ or ‘junior partners’ or ‘managing associates’ 
- that sort of sensitivity needs to be taken account of” (6). 
Multinational Knowledge 
management 
The importance partners place on expertise 
sharing and having support staff to organize 
knowledge management activities varies 
significantly between offices 
“Knowledge management is a function of what is done differently in each 
office. Part of the issue we have is that technically because of the 
licensing you’re not supposed to use a piece of software outside of the 
country it’s licensed for, so you couldn’t use our knowledge management 
software in Singapore. And then there’s the whole cultural thing – 
lawyers in New York don’t like paying for support staff to run the 
systems” (14).  
 
 
Table 6. Further examples of coordination strategies used to manage relational networks in US law firms. 
Source: Fieldwork. 
 
